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Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert

DAVID E. SEIDELSONO

THE PROBLEM
To LABEL THE RELUCTANCE of physicians to offer expert testimony on behalf

of a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action a "conspiracy of silence" may
be to attach a stigma to a natural and understandable human reaction. It
may well be that most lawyers would be equally loath to testify against a
fellow practitioner in a legal malpractice action. In either case, the unwillingness to testify probably can be attributed to one or a combination of the
following factors: recognition of the possibility of error in the performance
of a demanding profession, personal acquaintance with the defendant, realization-stark though often unspoken-that "there but for the grace of
God am I," and a natural reluctance to assume a Judas role. It is not the
purpose of this article, or the inclination of the author, to be critical of the
individual physician who is reluctant to so testify. The physician's primary
function is to treat the ill, and his professional milieu is composed of his
office, the sick-room, or the operating room. To him, the courtroom is an
alien environment, one likely to be considered hostile, and his presence there
interrupts the performance of his primary function. This interruption becomes a serious personal embarrassment when the purpose of the courtroom
proceeding is to determine the potential negligence of a professional colleague. It is not at all difficult to understand or even sympathize with these
reactions.
Yet such understanding and sympathy do nothing to ameliorate the plight
of a plaintiff crippled, deformed, or blinded by the negligent conduct of a
physician. To provide meaningful redress to the victim of medical incompetence a successful malpractice action must be had, or the real possibility
of such an action must exist to bring about an appropriate settlement. Such

*Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
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an action or the likelihood of such an action usually requires the availability of expert medical testimony on behalf of the plaintiff. Absent that requisite testimony, the innocent victim is without relief. To any personal
injury practitioner, probably to any lawyer, and very likely to most law
students, it is axiomatic that "One great obstacle facing the lawyer in malpractice cases is the problem of obtaining expert testimony."' Something so
generally recognized by the profession should be apparent also to the courts.
Yet as late as 1933, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island wrote:
Counsel for plaintiff.., makes the startling statement-which he states is based
on his experience in attempting to obtain expert medical testimony to support
the charge of negligence on the part of a defendant-that "there is no possible
way for anyone who suffers injury at the hands of a negligent physician to recover his just damages." .. . We are not convinced, notwithstanding the experience
of plaintiff's counsel, that the ethical standards of the medical profession countenance a course so subversive of justice and so opposed to the duty which the
profession owes the public .... We cannot believe that there are not in this state
many well-qualified physicians who would be willing to assist by their testimony
2
a person who was a victim of malpractice.
But such judicial naivete is the exception rather than the rule; most judges
are aware of the dilemma of the plaintiff in a malpractice action and this
awareness has been manifested in judicial opinions:
The law of malpractice is clearly defined in most jurisdictions as it is here.
Before the plaintiff-patient can recover, he must show that his injury has resulted from his doctor's failure to exercise that degree of care and skill exercised by
a doctor practicing the same specialty in his locality. In mounting such proof,
the plaintiff must prove by testimony from the defendant's own professional colleagues what the degree of care and skill in the area is and that the defendant
failed to exercise such care and skill. The human instinct for self-preservation
being what it is, there is often disclosed in the trial of these cases what has been
referred to as the conspiracy of silence-the refusal on the part of members of
the profession to testify against one of their own for fear that one day they, too,
may be defendants in a malpractice case.3
And, again-more forcefully stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that members of any county medical society
are extremely loath to testify against each other in a malpractice case.... Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the so-called ethical practi343, 344 (1961).
'Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 RI. 266, 268, 165 Atl. 900, 901 (1933).
8Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting).
140 ORE. L. Rav.
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tioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of his case.
This is largely due to the pressure exerted by medical societies and public liability insurance companies which issue policies of liability insurance to physicians
covering malpractice claims ... [R]egardless of the merits of the plaintiff's case,
physicians who are members of medical societies flock to the defense of the fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or heroic soul who for the sake of
truth and justice has the courage to run the risk of ostracism by his fellow prac4
titioners and the cancellation of his public liability insurance policy.
This judicial recognition had lead to judicial innovation. Courts have attempted to eliminate the requirement of expert testimony in appropriate
cases. "Occasionally expert testimony is not required where an injury results
to a part of the anatomy not being treated or operated upon and is of such
character as to warrant the inference of want of care from the testimony of
laymen or in light of the knowledge and experience of the jurors themselves." 5
When laymen are competent to determine whether the doctor has been negligent, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant departed from standard
practices. If, for example, the evidence shows that a surgeon bandaged an arm
too tightly, causing atrophy of muscles and nerves, or that a patient was badly
burned with a hot water bottle, or that the defendant used clairvoyant diagnosis,
the courts do not require the plaintiff to show that the methods used are eschewed by other reputable doctors .... 6
Whether the judicial technique employed be labeled res ipsa loquitor
or "the newer doctrines of 'common knowledge,' 'ulterior act,' 'mechanical
instrument,' or 'informed consent,' " it seems fair to say that courts have
eliminated the need for expert testimony in a growing number of cases.
Where once such testimony was required in the "overlooked sponge" cases,
many courts now are willing to permit these cases to go to the jury without
expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff.8 Apparently, as the mystique
of the operating room has been pierced-at least to the extent that judges
now know that sponge nurses exist and can (and should) count, that surgeons can (and should) supervise the count, and that surgical sponges can
(and perhaps should) be attached to threads with a brightly colored object
at the end of the thread remaining outside the incision-the courts have be' Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 483, 234 P.2d 34, 45 (1951).
'Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951).

8 Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLuM. L. REv. 1147, 1165 (1942).

7Note, Handling the Unique Problems of Medical Malpractice Actions, 10 S.D.L. Rzv.

137, 143 (1965).
6 PaossER, ToRTs 231 (3d ed. 1964).
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come satisfied that laymen can comprehend these more mundane and mechanical aspects of surgical practices. But one should not conclude that elimination of the requirement of expert testimony has become the rule. It remains the exception, and an exception to be applied "only in a restricted
class of malpractice cases"-those "where negligence on the part of a doctor
is demonstrated by facts which can be evaluated by resort to common knowledge . . ."9 A single example should serve to demonstrate just how restricted
the class of cases is. A lady named Grace Brown
entered the office of the doctor, a specialist in oral surgery, to have an impacted
molar removed. After a short wait a general anesthetic, sodium pentothal, was
administered. The operation to remove the impacted molar involved chipping
the jawbone using a hammer and chisel. After the operation the doctor did not
realize he had broken the jawbone, in spite of the fact that it was a compound
fracture, that is, the broken bone was showing through the tissue. His attention
to the fracture was called by his nurse.
When the defendant was asked on cross-examination, "What broke her jaw,
Doctor?" he answered, "We don't know. I am of the opinion that there must
have been a muscle contraction and that muscle contraction broke the jaw. Just
the same as a baseball player will break his arm, throwing the ball." When asked
whether he saw "any muscle contraction while [he was] working on Mrs. Brown's
mouth," the doctor answered, "No. No, I did not." When asked, "Doctor, at any
time that you used this mallet on this chisel, is it possible that you struck that
chisel too hard and that it would fracture the jawbone?" he answered, "Well, I
think if you used a great deal of force, but I think a man who has experience will
adjust the amount of force to meet the situation." The doctor further testified
that in his experience he had handled between fifty and sixty thousand patients
and that a great many of them involved the removal of impacted teeth. When
asked on how many occasions he had fractured a patient's jaw, he stated, "Oh,
I guess two or three times."10
In a per curiam opinion, the court affirmed the trial court's action directing
"a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case, on the issues of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur."11 Mrs. Brown had "offered no evidence of specific negligence, or evidence that defendant did not exercise
9 Huffman
10

v. Lindquist, supra note 4, at 477, 234 P.2d at 40.
Brown v. Keaveney, supra note 3, at 662.

UThe

defendant's testimony, elicited on cross-examination, indicated two possible causes

of the fractured mandible:
(1) a muscle contraction, or (2) excessive force in bringing the mallet into contact with
the chisel. The first cause would not have supported a verdict for the plaintiff; the second would. The defendant's testimony, that he observed no such muscle contraction,
and the almost incredible analogy of the baseball player breaking his arm throwing a
ball would seem to have justified submission to the jury, and a jury determination that
excessive force rather than a muscle contraction caused the fracture.
Brown v. Keaveney, 326 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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'that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by the profession in his
own or similar localities'."' 12 In other words, the plaintiff offered no expert
medical testimony. The reason? Plaintiff's counsel was unable to secure an
expert willing to offer opinion testimony.' 8
Comforting as it may be to know that one may recover in a malpractice
action even without expert medical testimony if he is made the unwilling
host to a surgical sponge, burned by a hot water bottle, or harmed by a
clairvoyant diagnosis,' 4 the fact remains that in an overwhelming majority
of malpractice actions expert testimony is the sine qua non of plaintiff's case.
Judicial innovation hasn't changed that fact; it hasn't overcome that "One
great obstacle facing the lawyer in malpractice cases...."15 It seems a fair
conclusion that "A careful appraisal shows that the common law imagination has not been able to cope with the challenges of the malpractice action." 16
SCREENING PANELS

If judicial innovation is incapable of solving the problem, what other
means exist? Well, one mode of solution is an arrangement, either formal
or informal, between local medical societies and bar associations. One such
arrangement, and one frequently alluded to, is the ".... Pima County Screening Plan. Since its adoption in Pima County, Arizona, it has been considered
or tried in Idaho, New Mexico, Virginia and in one county in Iowa, New
York, Nevada and Pennsylvania.' 7 Those among the readers who may be
plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers and, therefore, sensitive to and offended
by the connotation of the word "Screening" in the plan's title, are counseled
toward patience; the "best" is yet to come. Under the Pima County Plan,
a lawyer undertaking a medical malpractice claim presents his case to a panel
composed of nine physicians and lawyers.' 8 The potential defendant also
may present his side of the case to the panel, and each side has the opportunity of cross-examining the other's witnesses.' 9 The degree of formality
"xId. at 660-61.
"Telephone Conversation With Earl H. Davis, Washington D.C., counsel for the plaintiff.

14Morris, supra note 6.
15Supra note 1.
"77 HARv. L. REv. 333, 349 (1963).
11 Note, supra note 7, at 149.
"Sadusk, Obtaining Expert Advice in Professional Liability Cases, 20 J. Mo. BAR 200,
201 (1964). The number of panelists may vary in the various jurisdictions where the plan

is utilized.

1In Virginia, "a plan was evolved for the screening of malpractice cases" in 1961. Virginia
Bar News, Dec. 1965, p. 1. However, until late in 1965, the potential defendant could bar
the potential plaintiff's access to the panel by the simple device of refusing to consent to
utilization of the panel. In October 1965, "after a few dedicated physicians had done a
great deal of ground work, the Medical Society approved (an] amendment so that now a
claimant can bring his case before the Panel whether or not the physician agrees." Id. at 2.
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of the presentation may vary from panel to panel and case to case, but it is
probably a fair guess that the proceedings would be about as formal as one
would expect, considering the number and composition of the panelists and
the panel.2 0 To the extent that "formality" suggests unduly restrictive practices which make it difficult to ascertain facts, the lack of formality may be
beneficial. However, absence of that formality which focuses attention upon
the relevant and which tends to induce responsive answers even to uncomfortably pertinent questions would be unfortunate. In addition to, in fact,
before, hearing the witnesses, the panel inspects applicable medical records. 21 Then, after completion of the entire process, the panel decides
whether or not "there is any substantial evidence of a substantial injury arising out of malpractice." 22 If the panel does find substantial evidence of a
substantial injury so caused, its members are to attempt to effect a settlement or, that failing, provide the plaintiff expert medical testimony for
trial.23 If the panel does not make the requisite affirmative findings, counsel
for the plaintiff is expected to drop the case-but, of course, "he is under no
'
"The plan is entirely voluntary ....-"25
legal obligation to do so."24
or, for that matter, any lawyer who has ever
lawyer
Any personal injury
tried a case is likely to experience certain reactions to this arrangement.
First, assuming an affirmative panel finding, plaintiff's counsel will be required to "try" his case twice: once for the panel and once for the court and
jury. No lawyer is likely to be particularly delighted with the prospect of
such duplicative effort. Moreover, the first time around-the "panel trial"plaintiff's counsel will have to present his case without benefit of expert
medical testimony, since the purpose of the panel proceeding is to determine
whether or not plaintiff is "entitled" to expert testimony. Presumably, if
plaintiff's counsel had a willing and available expert witness, he wouldn't
have boarded the merry-go-round in the first place. Consequently, he must
persuade the panel to make the requisite findings in order to secure the expert witness whose testimony will be essential, legally and practically, in
persuading a court and jury, and he must so persuade the panel without
the testimony of that essential witness, and persuade it sufficiently to evoke
a finding of substantial evidence of a substantial injury arising out of the
potential defendant's malpractice, probably more than would be necessary
to avoid a nonsuit at trial. In court, it probably would be deemed legally
sufficient if plaintiff introduced appropriate credible evidence of an injury
""The procedure is essentially informal." Sadusk, supra note 18, at 201.
Ibid.

Note, supra note 7, at 149.
Ibid.
,Id. at 150.
2Id.

at 149.
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caused by defendant's professional negligence. So plaintiff's counsel's burden of persuasion before the panel is a difficult one, and one which must
be satisfied without the most essential and pertinent evidence on the point:
expert medical testimony. Of course, the presence of physicians on the panel
should serve to obviate the need of an expert witness. Presumably, the
physician-panelists will not require expert testimony to comprehend the
medical problems involved. Unfortunately, though, the patient may find it
rather difficult to describe the professional diagnosis, treatment, or technique with sufficient clarity even for the medical panelists. And the judge
of the adequacy of the performance of the task, the physician-lawyer panel,
may not be the most sympathetic fact-finding body imaginable.
Without intending to impute any improper motive to the physicianmembers of the panel, it is suggested that their presence on the panel would
not ease plaintiff's task of persuasion. Assuming the highest degree of ethical
and objective conscious consideration of the case on the part of the physicians (and this is the only appropriate assumption), it is submitted that
the likelihood of subconscious identity with the potential defendant is so
significant as to militate substantially against an unbiased determination
by the physician-panelists. To make the point somewhat dramatically, the
following question is suggested: Would the physician-panelists make appropriate jurors in a medical malpractice case?
These reactions to the Pima County Plan are admittedly intuitive in nature, and, to some extent, "practical" rather than doctrinal. The author has
no data supporting the reactions and no tangible evidence of the degree or
effect of panelists' empathy with potential defendants. The Plan may be
too new to provide meaningful data, 26 and tangible evidence of a subconscious empathy may be simply impossible to secure. But the intuitive nature
of the reactions should not serve as a basis for dismissing them out of hand,
nor should the practical aspects of the arrangement be overlooked in determining its theoretical value. Often, a lawyer's intuitive response to a factual
situation and his awareness of the limits imposed by practicality comprise
valuable professional assets, and frequently this kind of response and awareness point toward ponderables approaching conclusions. The reactions to
the Pima County Plan suggest a couple of these ponderables: Why do plaintiffs' lawyers submit to such a "voluntary" plan? And why are physicians
permitted the insulating protection of the interprofessional panel?
The first one is easy. Submission is the price counsel must pay for the op"Sadusk, supra note 18, at 201: "It is perhaps still too early to know what the final outcome will be, but Professor Lesher's report in Arizona Medicine some time ago would lead
me to believe the plan will be successful." Dr. Sadusk, at the time his paper was presented,
was Chairman of the Committee on Medicolegal Problems, American Medical Association.

1966]

Medical Malpractice Cases

portunity of securing expert medical testimony. The lawyer who fails to utilize the plan will find himself sitting on a potential malpractice action without available expert testimony-not a very restful or comfortable position.
The second is a little more difficult. Of course, the medical profession is
demanding, physically, mentally, and emotionally. Its members require postgraduate education and in-the-profession experience (an internship). Its
specialists require additional education and experience. Its practice requires
frequent decision making, in some cases erratic hours, and appropriate manual dexterity. In short, it is a complex profession. So what? Building a sixtystory skyscraper is complex too; but the contractor who undertakes the job
isn't given the benefit of an insulating panel to protect him from potential
causes of action arising out of his alleged negligent performance. Should
such an action arise, the plaintiff will encounter no great difficulty in securing appropriate experts willing to testify as to defendant's negligence, if, in
fact, such negligence occurred. If the defendant's negligence resulted in injury or death to one person or dozens of people, he will still not enjoy a partial mantle of immunity through the device of an interprofessional panel;
the appropriate experts will remain willing to testify. Is there some subtle,
yet significant, distinction between a physician and a contractor which would
justify the insulation afforded the former?
It should be conceded immediately that the "recipient" of the contractor's services is an inanimate structure, whereas the physician's services are
directed to that complex of biological and psychological processes known
as a human being. To be sure, steel, stone, and glass are more likely to be
obeisant to inexorable laws of chemistry and physics than is that complicated organism, man. The patient's reaction to diagnosis, treatment, or prognosis will be peculiar to him, and different patients will 'eact differently. The
differences may be caused by physical or psychic conditions, and these conditions may not always be reasonably predictable by the physician. However,
to the extent that an unfortunate medical result can be attributed to a condition not reasonably predictable by the physician-or the unfortunate result could not reasonably have been avoided by him-the unforseen result
is not very likely to give rise to a malpractice action. Even more certainly,
such an idiosyncratic result will not bring about a judicial determination
of liability. But isn't the patient-physician relationship a distinguishing factor? After all, a contractor's work, if properly done, will bring about a satisfactory result, regardless of his personal relationships with the architect,
subcontractors, suppliers, and the client. However, without an appropriate
patient-physician relationship the doctor's healing art is diminished, regardless of his professional competence; and allegations of professional negligence against one physician tend to affect adversely the relationships be-
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tween many physicians and patients. In other words, so the argument goes,
a single legal assertion of medical incompetence destroys the image of the
healer, so inherent a part of successful medical practice. Nonsense. If anything
has the potential of destroying that image it is a general realization by the
public that the medical profession has created for itself a special immunity
from liability for professional incompetence through the screening device of
an interprofessional panel. It seems fair to assume that just as patients generally are likely to become aware of allegations of negligence set forth in a
complaint against one named physician, so, too, are they likely to discover
the balustrade of immunity the medical profession has attempted to construct. Even if general knowledge of the latter should be disseminated more
slowly (because, for example, of the absence of that newspaper coverage
which might exist in connection with a judicial proceeding), it will become
known eventually. The fact that it arises out of an organized scheme formulated by the profession generally is likely to have a greater adverse effect
on the physician's image than allegations of negligence aimed at a specific
physician.
As to the specific physician, the malpractice action defendant, it has been
suggested that the mere allegation of professional negligence in a legal complaint may do irreparable damage to his professional standing and practice.
A corollary to this suggestion is that for that reason the physician is uniquely
susceptible to groundless claims of professional incompetence. A couple of
responses occur to these contentions. First, the suggested high incidence of
such false claims being handled by lawyers imputes to members of the legal
profession a lack of ethics, morality, and personal integrity, that is undeserved. It may also impute to them an unsound economic approach in determining which cases to undertake and which to refuse, but this imputation is not so serious as the first. Second, it is not necessarily true that physicians are peculiarly appealing targets for negligence actions. If an allegation of negligence is directed at a building contractor, asserting negligence
in construction and consequent personal injuries or deaths, the contractor
may find his occupational standing adversely affected and future building
contracts difficult to come by. Imagine the occupational and economic jeopardy that would arise from an allegation that a contractor's negligence resulted in the collapse of an office building with resulting injuries and deaths.
In fact, it may be fair to say that allegations of professional or occupational
negligence aimed at anyone will adversely affect his professional or occupational standing and his billfold. The doctor is not unique in this respect.
It may be suggested that the physician requires the protection of a screening panel so that he may exercise his professional judgment in determining
whether or not to employ a relatively new medical or surgical technique.

1966]

Medical Malpractice Cases

If fettered by potential malpractice actions, the physician may be unwilling
to utilize advanced professional methods, thus depriving his patients of the
advantage of medical progress. Consequently, the screening panel is a necessary device to assure the patient-public that it will benefit from the time,
money, and energy devoted to medical research.
It may be helpful in analyzing this suggestion, first, to compare once more
the circumstances of the physician and the contractor, and then to examine
the physician's potential dilemma wholly on its own merits.
The building contractor, too, might be reluctant to employ new building
techniques if the use could result in liability. And, again, the public would
be deprived of the advantages of new construction methods. Yet, the contractor does not enjoy the protective wall erected around the physician; with
no screening panel, the contractor must exercise his judgment in determining whether or not to use an available new technique in the performance of
a particular contract and, assuming it is used, utilize the appropriate degree
of skill and care in its use. If either his judgment or his skill is found wanting, and injury results thereby, he may be liable. In determining the soundness of the contractor's judgment and the propriety of his performance,
counsel for an injured plaintiff will encounter no significant difficulty in
obtaining appropriate expert assistance. If an action and trial ensue, the
expert will appear and testify for the plaintiff. Why should not the same be
true in connection with the judgment and performance of a physician?
The assertion that malpractice actions will discourage the utilization of
the fruit of medical research is self-defeating even absent the physician-contractor comparison. It may be fair to assume that before a new medical or
surgical technique is employed generally it will have been tested thoroughly.
Laboratory testing, animal testing, and selective testing on humans (fully
advised, of course, of the experimental nature of the technique), are the
usual prerequisites to general medical or surgical usage. The results of these
tests and evaluations of the novel technique will be available to the practitioner. Some medical consensus of the efficacy, safety, and general acceptability of the technique will evolve. None would deny that a practitioner
has access to such materials. Hopefully, none would deny that a practitioner
contemplating the use of a relatively new technique has a duty to familiarize
himself with the available materials. Assuming all of this, what are the possible eventualities? Well, the practitioner might decide that the new technique is not an improvement and eschew its use. If so, a potential finding of
negligence presumably would rest upon his failure to use it. If the non-use
can be justified by a reputable, recognized school of medical opinion, a finding of negligence is extremely unlikely, if, indeed, even possible. (And, here,
the physician hasn't been deterred from the use of a novel technique by fear
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of litigation; rather, his professional judgment has decided against use of the
new for wholly professional reasons.)
On the other hand, the practitioner might decide to employ the new technique. If so, a potential finding of negligence could rest upon (I) poor judgment in so doing, or (2) poor performance in utilizing the technique. In
the former case, if use of the technique can be justified by a reputable, recognized school of medical opinion, a finding of negligence would be improper.
In the latter case, a finding of negligence would be proper only upon the
adduction of expert testimony that the practitioner's method or manner of
utilizing the technique was not an acceptable one. Who, then, among the
medical practitioners would suffer liability as the consequence of using or
failing to use a new technique? It would be that one who made the decision
to use or not use without appropriate consideration and contemplatiorf of
existing medical materials and opinion, or that one who utilized the technique in a medically unacceptable manner. Which of these should be given
the protection of a screening panel, the one who didn't do his homework, or
if he did, ignored its lesson, or the one who may have done some homework
but failed to prepare himself to put it to practical use, or, at best, had a "bad
day"? Well, of course, neither should enjoy any special immunity from liability for the consequences of his professional negligence. And, the lack of
such special immunity (in the guise of a screening panel) isn't likely to deprive patients of the appropriate use of advanced medical techniques.
If the physician is not unique in that he is engaged in a complex occupation (and it is submitted he is not), if he is not peculiarly susceptible to false
claims of occupational negligence (and it is submitted he is not), if public
awareness of medical malpractice actions will not have a greater adverse effect upon the physician-patient relationship than will public awareness of
the profession's effort to afford itself the protection of a screening panel (and
it is submitted that it will not), and if the absence of such a screening panel
will not preclude society from the timely enjoyment of medical advances
(and it is submitted that it will not), what is the justification for the screening panel? There isn't any. Its "justification," using thatword in the sense of
explaining its existence, lies in the reason lawyers submit to such a "voluntary" plan: it provides the only opportunity. to secure medical testimony for
the plaintiff in a malpractice action. It exists because a sufficient number of
physicians wish it to exist; it subsists because a sufficient number of lawyers
suffer its existence as something preferable to nothing. And that, really, is
the theoretical or doctrinal objection to the screening plan. Its existence is
unjustified. It exists simply because physicians don't like to be sued in malpractice actions. Unlike other potential defendants who probably don't like
to be sued, physicians have the ability, which they have utilized by their re-
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fusal to testify voluntarily, to frustrate such actions-or, at least, "screen"
them.
BOOKS AND TREATsEs

Is there a satisfactory alternative to the screening plan and its interprofessional panel? Massachusetts and Nevada by students27 and Alabama by judicial opinion 28 permit the plaintiff to use books or treatises in lieu of expert
medical testimony in a malpractice case. The Massachusetts statute, after
which the Nevada statute was modeled, provides:
A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained in a
published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the
court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the writer of such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against
physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria, as evidence
tending to prove said fact or as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the
party intending to offer as evidence any such statement shall, not less than three
days before the trial of the action, give the adverse party notice of such intention,
stating the name of the writer of the statement and the title of the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained. 29
It will be noted that the statute requires that the proffered treatise be written by a recognized expert. The normal manner of so qualifying an author
is by the testimony of another qualified expert. But the statute's raison d'etre
is plaintiff's inability to secure an expert witness in a malpractice action. To
suppose that a physician unwilling to testify for plaintiff in a medical malpractice case would be willing to lend his expert assistance and testimony
for the limited purpose of qualifying the author of a medical book seems unrealistic. "[I]t is likely that the doctor would be reluctant to testify. His testimony would be used to qualify an author whose book would be used against
a fellow practitioner." 30 Of course, plaintiff can call defendant as for crossexamination for the purpose of qualifying the author, but a possible response from defendant would be, "I'm afraid I'm not familiar with the book
or its author." The possibility is sufficiently great to make this a rather undesirable method of qualifying the author. Trial counsel naturally is reluctant to have an essential element of his case depend upon testimony of an
adverse party; where a book is to be used instead of an expert for the pur= MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, §79C (1959); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 1, ch. 51.040 (1959).
2Staudenheimer v. Williams, 29 Ala. 558 (1857).

MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (1959).
8045 MINN. L. REV,. 1019, 1030 (1961).
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pose of establishing professional negligence, the qualification of the author
is essential.
After eliminating an independent expert and the defendant as likely witnesses to qualify the author, counsel is likely to think of utilizing biographical information in the book itself, the Directory of Medical Specialists, and
Who's Who. But each of these methods of qualification was attempted, unsuccessfully, in a malpractice action in which plaintiff sought to utilize the
Massachusetts statute.3 ' That leaves qualification by stipulation, and it
would be a rare defendant's lawyer who would stipulate to the qualification
of the author of a medical book, knowing that such action might be the only
means available to the plaintiff in avoiding a nonsuit. So, mechanically, the
use of books and treatises in place of expert testimony poses serious problems.
Even assuming that the mechanical problems of qualification can be
solved, there remains a grave shortcoming to such use of learned treatises.
The plaintiff "lucky" enough to avoid a nonsuit by the use of a medical book
will find his book-evidence controverted by the testimony of the defendant
and those physicians who, "regardless of the merits of the plaintiff's case,
...[will] flock to the defense of their fellow member charged with malpractice."3 2 One suspects that it would be a rare jury which would give greater
credibility to a statement read from a book than to the live testimony of a
parade of expert medical witnesses. This suspicion is fortified by the fact
that the jury may not be wholly aware of the reason the plaintiff relied on a
medical book and "failed" to offer expert medical testimony on his own behalf. An explanation that such expert testimony was not available, to the
extent the court would permit such explanation, probably would do little
to improve the plaintiff's case in the eyes of the jury. Moreover, even the
81Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956). The court's refusal to
accept biographical material in the book, itself, probably can be justified by a recognition
of a publisher's natural desire to present his author in the most favorable light possible.
Refusal to accept material from Who's Who (the English edition) might be explained on
two grounds: (1) such material is usually provided by the person listed; and (2) any verification would not be done by persons competent to determine the professional qualifications of the physician listed. It is somewhat more difficult to justify the court's refusal to
accept information from the Directory of Medical Specialists.
"The Directory... is the authorized publication of 19 official specialty boards certifying
physicians in medical specialities." DiREcrosy OF MEDICWAL SPECIALisss 7 (12th ed. 1965).
"Only Diplomates are included in this Directory. The secretary of each American board
serves on the Advisory Committee to the Board of Editors of the Directory and the names
to be included are supplied by them. The biographic data are furnished by the Diplomates
themselves, and certification is verified by the specialty boards." Id. at 8.
"The searching investigation and the rigid examinations of each individual certified by
the specialty boards give an authoritative stamp of approval to his status as a qualified specialist." Ibid.
- Huffman v. Lindquist, supra note 4.
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most literate medical treatise is likely to contain words and phrases not entirely clear to the jury. Who is to explain their meaning for the plaintiff?
After the defendant and his expert witnesses have duly impressed the jury
with their professional competence, in part by their appropriate use of some
select medical esoterica, they will be only too glad to respond to defense
counsel's request, "Doctor, would you be kind enough to explain that in
terms we can all understand?"
All factors considered, it would be difficult to persuade many plaintiffs'
lawyers that "The Massachusetts and Nevada statutes are probably the best
way to overcome the conspiracy of silence among doctors."8 3 More readily
believable is the conclusion that "there is considerable evidence that the
[Massachusetts] statute has afforded little, if any, real help to Massachusetts
malpractice plaintiffs. The defendant is usually able to keep the plaintiff's
books out; and when the plaintiff does succeed in getting books in, they are
of relatively little assistance to him.... Malpractice plaintiffs still labor under a severe evidentiary handicap; worthy actions fail, many others are never
brought. That miscarriage of justice which the legislature sought ...to
34
remedy continues... essentially unabated."
COMPULSORY

APPOINTMENT OF MEDICAL EXPERTS BY LEGISLATION

The legislatures of Rhode Island, Indiana, and California have enacted statutes35 which appear to be suited to securing compulsory testimony of a medical expert on behalf of a plaintiff in a malpractice action. These lawmaking
bodies take a position contrary to rule 59 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence36
37
which provides for "consent" on the part of the appointed expert. (It is
suggested that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute re-evaluate their position in light of the malpractice problem,
perhaps referring to the wording of one of these statutes or reverting to section 1 of the Model Expert Testimony Act, all of which do not require con38
sent.)
33Supra note 30, at 1048.
"Kehoe, Massachusetts Malpractice Evidentiary Statute-Success or Failure? 44 B.U.L.
REV. 10, 28-29 (1964). Mr. Kehoe's study of the Massachusetts statute is extremely helpful.
"R.I. GEN. LAws ANN., § 9-17-19 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1722 (1946); CAL. Cr1. PROC.
CODE, § 1871, repealed by Stat. 1965 ch. 299, § 59, operative Jan. 1, 1967, to be replaced by
§§ 723, 730-33 of California's new EVIDENCE CODE.
The Rules of Evidence were approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1953. They have been adopted
by statute in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401-70 (1963), the Panama Canal Zone, 5
C.Z.C. §§ 2731-996 (1962), and the Virgin Islands, 5 V.I.C. §§ 771-956 (1957).

" "An expert witness shall not be appointed unless he consents to act .
59.

.. ", UNIFORM RuLE

OF EVIDENCE
8

Whenever in civil or criminal proceedings, issues arise upon which the court deems expert
evidence as desirable, the court on its own motion, or on the request of either the
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The Rhode Island Justice whose credulity was strained by "the startling
statement" of plaintiff's counsel that he was unable "to obtain expert medical testimony to support the charge of negligence on the part of a defendant,"3 9 conceded that "plaintiff's counsel might have had recourse to the
Rhode Island statute, General laws 1923. .. "'40which reads:
Any justice of the superior court may, in any cause, civil or criminal, on motion
of any party therein, appoint one or more disinterested skilled persons, whether
they be residents or nonresidents, to serve as expert witnesses therein; provided,
that the reasonable fees of such experts, according to the character of the service
to be performed, as fixed by such justice, shall be paid by the party moving for
such appointment...; and the amount so paid shall form part of the costs in the
41
cause ....
The California and Indiana statutes are similar in substance to that of
Rhode Island, except that Indiana's act provides that the "expert.. . may
be compelled to... testify.., without payment or tender of compensation
other than the per diem and mileage allowed by law to witnesses, under the
same rules and regulations by which he can be compelled to appear and testify to his knowledge of facts relevant to the same issue." 42 It seems rather
clear that each of the statutes would be applicable to a potential medical
expert in a malpractice action.
Since the element of consent is not required, an appropriate first step in
considering these statutes is to determine whether or not they are unconstitutional. Two constitutional provisions come to mind: the due process
clause43 and the prohibition of involuntary servitude. 44 There is very little,
if any, current clear authority either way as to either of the clauses. In the
California Code of Civil Procedure following the statute providing for com-

state or the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or of any party in a civil proceeding,
may appoint one or more experts, not exceeding three on each issue to testify at the
trial.
MODEL EXPERT TESTIMONY

Acr I. This act was approved by the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1937 as a Uniform Act, and was redesignated as a Model Act in 1943. The authority of the act is considerably weakened by the fact that South Dakota alone adopted the act by State Supreme
Court rule, Order No. 5 (1942), and that the Commissioners altered their position by requiring "consent" in the 1942 Uniform Rules of Evidence, without comment on the change.
19Coleman v. McCarthy, supra note 2.
IGIbid. (One can hardly avoid wondering why the Justice thought the legislature felt
compelled to enact the statute.)
" R. I. GEN. LAws ANN., § 9-17-19 (1956).
'2ND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1722 (1946).
,-... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
""Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States ... "
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
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pulsory expert testimony the following appears: "The statute is constitu-45
tional. Hastings Estate ....
Unfortunately, the Hastings46 case is somewhat less than determinative
of the constitutionality of a statute providing for compulsory expert testimony in a malpractice action. Hastings was a suit commenced to establish
heirship to a decedent in which the court appointed a disinterested expert
to offer testimony concerning the validity of certain documents. On appeal
from an adverse decision, the petitioner seeking to prove heirship contended
that the statute authorizing the appointment of the expert was unconstitutional. Without discussing the specific constitutional provisions allegedly
violated, the court dismissed petitioner's contention out of hand, noting that
(1) use of the statute had been approved earlier in a homicide case, and
(2) by failing to object to the appointment or qualifications of the witness
at trial, petitioner had waived any objection to the appointment. Citation
of the earlier criminal case by the court does little to determine the constitutional propriety of a statute authorizing compulsory expert testimony in a
civil action. 47 The constitutional issues in a criminal action differ markedly
from those in a malpractice action, even though the due process clause may
be involved in both. Presumably, in a malpractice action the appointed expert would challenge the constitutionality of a statute compelling him to
lend his professional services to a client he did not choose to work for. In a
criminal action, it is usually the accused who challenges the validity of the
appointment of the expert.
For example, in Jessner v. State,48 the court utilized a statute providing
for the appointment of an expert in criminal proceedings. The medical expert appointed examined the accused for the purpose of determining his
competency to stand trial and his competency at the time of the alleged commission of the criminal act. The expert found the accused to be competent,
and he was convicted. On appeal the defendant asserted that use of the
court-appointed expert resulted in an illegal search and seizure, self-incrimination, and denial of a jury trial. Each of these assertions except the last
(about which, more shortly) would be inapposite in a case involving the
compulsory testimony of a medical expert in a malpractice action. And, incidentally, each of the assertions was found wanting.
In People v. Dickerson,49 the Supreme Court of Michigan found that a
statute empowering a court in a homicide case to appoint a disinterested ex'5Supra note 35, Notes of Decisions, A. 1.
In re Hasting, 206 Cal. 524, 274 Pac. 973 (1929).
,"
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure avoids this problem by requiring "consent"
on the part of the appointed expert. FED.R. CiuM. P. 28.
48202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).

10164 Mich. 148, 129 N.W. 199 (1910).
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pert did violate the due process clause in that it made it impossible for the
accused to know in advance of trial all those who would testify against him,
to examine their character, and to prepare a proper defense. Moreover, the
court held that notice to the jury that an expert had been appointed by the
court would result in the jury's giving undue weight to the testimony of the
court-appointed expert to the detriment of the testimony offered by other
expert witnesses, thus precluding an effective jury determination.
So it seems that there is a split of judicial authority as to the constitutionality of statutes authorizing court-appointed experts in criminal proceedings, and many of the constitutional issues involved in those proceedings
would be irrelevant to a determination of the validity of compulsory medical
testimony in malpractice actions. However, the problem of jury knowledge
of the appointment of an expert does have relevancy; it probably is fair to
say that a jury would tend to extend greater credibility to an expert appointed by the court than to those selected by the interested parties. Consequently, if compulsory expert testimony through court appointment is
found not to be otherwise unconstitutional, appropriate care should be taken to present the appointed expert (for the plaintiff) just as any other expert witness for the party would be presented. Contrary to rule 61 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence and section 8 of the Model Expert Testimony
Act, 50 there would seem to be no need to advise the jury of a court appointment; in fact, in most cases the "appointment" would be nothing more than
the compulsion necessary to secure an expert desired by the plaintiff.
It is that compulsion which lies at the heart of constitutional objections to
statutes authorizing a court to appoint a medical expert in malpractice actions. It is settled beyond dispute that a court may compel one in possession
of relevant facts to testify in a civil action. It seems to be equally settled that
a physician who has treated a patient can be compelled to testify as to the
personal knowledge (and, probably, professional opinion) secured as the result of such treatment. The difficult question is: May a physician be compelled to make preliminary preparations or perform professional services
or listen to testimony for the purpose of qualifying himself to give expert
testimony and then to offer such testimony?
Probably the most accurate description of the case authority on the point
is that it is inconsistent, inconclusive, and passe. If a sample is desired, this
one is offered:
It is quite generally agreed that in the absence of statutory authorization one
cannot be required to make preliminary preparations or perform professional
51E.g., "The fact of the appointment of an expert witness by the judge may be revealed
to the trier of the facts as relevant to the credibility of such witness and the weight of his
testimony." UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 61.
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services, or to listen to testimony, for the purpose of qualifying himself to give a
professional opinion or otherwise testify as an expert, or, at least, as held or stated in some cases, he may not be required to do so without the payment or ten51
der of extra compensation therefor.
It is difficult to imagine a sentence of comparable length quite so full-bellied
with negative pregnants. Suppose statutory authority exists? Suppose the
statute does not authorize extra compensation? Suppose no statute exists but
extra compensation is tendered? And, just to strive toward the essence of the
problem, what is the real significance of "statutory authorization"?
Although the Model Expert Testimony Act, section 5, and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, rule 59, infer that an appointee may be compelled to prepare for trial, there is a lack of lucid and current judicial authority on this
matter of critical importance. This void invites independent thought directed
toward arriving at some sensible and satisfactory conclusions which may
commend themselves to the courts.
The necessity for "payment or tender of extra compensation," i.e., compensation in excess of that paid a lay witness, smacks of due process. After
all, one who utilizes his professional skill and services for the benefit of another ought to be paid. To require one to work for a litigant without compensation certainly results in a deprivation of a thing of value-expert services-without due process. Moreover, if plaintiff in a malpractice action were
able to secure a willing expert witness, the plaintiff and the expert unquestionably would agree to the payment of a reasonable fee to the expert for his
services. There seems to be no justification for depriving the expert of his
fee simply because he is "compelled" to render his services for the plaintiff.
One could argue that deprivation of a fee in the event of court appointment
might encourage experts to offer their services willingly to malpractice plaintiffs, thereby assuring themselves of an appropriate fee, but such an argument seems inadequate to compel one to work for another without payment.
This conclusion suggests that the Indiana statute, providing that the "expert ... may be compelled to... testify.., without payment or tender of
compensation other than the per diem and mileage allowed by law to witnesses," would be violative of due process if applied to an expert compelled
to testify (and to make adequate preparation therefor) in a malpractice action. Both the California and Rhode Island statutes expressly provide for
the payment of reasonable expert fees, while both rule 60 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence and section 10 of the Model Expert Testimony Act contain provisions for compensation to be determined by the judge.
The due process clause, in addition to protecting property (in this case
eaAnnot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1189 (1961).
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the physician's services) prohibits a state from depriving one of his liberty
without due process of law. Does a statute authorizing a court to appoint an
expert to serve a malpractice action plaintiff against the will and contrary
to the desire of the expert violate that portion of the clause? If the question
were put, may one be compelled to work for another contrary to the worker's will, the almost compulsive answer would be no. Especially so in this
country where such involuntary service is "utterly incompatible with our
institutions, and the fundamental law of the land."5 2 Clearly, the liberty to select one's employer, protected by the due process clause, is intimately related to the constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude. So intimate
is the relationship that it may be appropriate to examine the two provisions
of the fundamental law together.
The historical background and chronology of the two provisions intimate
rather strongly that they were aimed at eliminating the abridgment of liberty
suffered by the slaves. Of course, the due process clause has been given much
wider application. But insofar as the liberty of selecting one's employer is
concerned, the due process clause almost perforce refers one back to the
thirteenth amendment. That amendment was intended to terminate slavery
as it had theretofore existed. Then why the conjunctive phrase, "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime ... "?
A couple of responses come to mind. First, slavery as it had existed comprehended a property right in the slave owned by the master.58 The amendment
intended to eliminate that property right and involuntary servitude tantamount to slavery but without the property right; in other words, it was intended to eliminate the substance as well as the form of the evil of slavery.
Second, it is conceivable that the drafters contemplated a form of service different from slavery in that wages, however low, might be paid and the servant be permitted to come to and leave his place of employment, but in which
the servant would be required to remain in the master's employ. The conjunctive phrasing may have been aimed at that evil, again the substance if
not the pure form of slavery.
It seems rather clear that the compulsory rendering of professional services by an expert witness in a malpractice action is distinguishable from the
substance and the form of slavery which pre-existed the thirteenth amendment. It should be noted, however, that a court, in affirming the vacating
of an injunction, stated that "When a court of equity intervenes to compel
the employee to specifically perform a contract for personal service, his service becomes involuntary, and his position becomes one of involuntary servitude, a condition utterly incompatible with our institutions, and the fundaI Gossard Co. v. Crosley, 132 Iowa 155, 170, 109 N.W. 483, 489 (1906).

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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mental law of the land." 54 However, the facts of the case should be noted too.

Plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of ladies' corsets, sought to enjoin defendant, who had contracted to demonstrate and
sell plaintiff's product, from demonstrating and selling other apparently
similar corsets. Much of the court's opinion emphasized the difficulty in determining whether or not one compelled to perform a contract for personal
service was performing properly, a difficulty long recognized by equity
courts. Consequently, while the court in Crosby stated that compulsory performance of a contract for personal service would constitute involuntary
servitude contrary to the fundamental law of the land, it is submitted that
the decision does not resolve the question of the constitutional validity or
invalidity of a statute authorizing compulsory expert testimony in a malpractice action.
First, while the differences between a reluctant medical expert and a corset demonstrator-saleswoman may not be so great as those between the expert and a slave, significant differences do exist. The period of employment
contracted for by the corsetier was two years. The professional services rendered by an expert in a malpractice action probably would consist of a
history-taking, examination, consultation with counsel, and an appearance
in court if the action were not settled. The actual time required of the expert under court compulsion would be considerably less than that involved
in Crosby; consequently, the likelihood of regular or even sporadic court
intervention or supervision would be considerably less. Moreover, one would
like to believe that a court-appointed physician would be more likely to
comply with the conditions of his appointment than a corset demonstratorsaleswoman. The sense of professional responsibility of the former (though
perhaps not sufficient to overcome the natural causes of reluctance to testify
in limine), should be greater than the latter. On a more mundane level,
the physician is more intimately rooted to his locale and practice than a
traveling corset demonstrator, therefore, probably more sensitive to a local
court order. And on the lowest level, the physician may be considerably more
sensitive to adverse publicity arising from non-compliance with a court order
than the corset saleswoman.
These factors tend to suggest that court supervision of an appointed expert in a malpractice case would not entail the extent or degree of difficulty
inherent in judicial supervision of a non-professional defendant in an equity
suit, and that such court appointment probably would not be violative of
the thirteenth amendment. One constitutional authority has suggested that
the amendment probably doesn't apply even to the non-professional defendant in an equity proceeding:
5Gossard Co. v. Crosley, supra note 52, at 170, 109 N.W. at 488-89.
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The author is not convinced that the draftsmen of the Thirteenth Amendment
intended to prevent an equity court from holding an artist or artisan with distinctive talents to his contract, although obviously state judicial activity can be
as evil as legislative impositions of servitude when imposed upon industrial or
agricultural workers in general.5
One final point should be made concerning the constitutionality of statutes
authorizing court appointment of experts in malpractice actions. The plaintiff's need for such expert testimony arises from a judicially created standard
by which the conduct of the defendant physician is to be judged. The courts
have seen fit to fashion a professional standard rather than the reasonably
prudent man standard generally utilized in negligence cases. To say that a
statute authorizing a court to give a malpractice plaintiff the opportunity
of securing the requisite testimony to establish the professional standard (an
opportunity demonstrably lacking absent judicial intervention) is violative
of the Constitution, would be to place the court (and the plaintiff) in an
impossible posture; the court would lack the ability to compel compliance
with its own requirement, despite the plaintiff's keen desire to comply. Such
a result suggests the ineptitude of concluding that authorizing statutes are
unconstitutional.
COMPULSORY APPOINTMENT OF MEDICAL EXPERTS BY JUDICIAL ORDER

The preceding result suggests, too, a further question: Should a court be
deemed to have the power to appoint an expert in a malpractice case even
absent specific statutory authority? The question is one of some importance.
Even assuming the constitutional validity of such authorizing statutes, the
task of securing an expert for the plaintiff remains unaided in the many
states lacking such statutes. One could suggest that the "organized bar"
should initiate or, where already initiated, increase appropriate lobbying
activities to have such a statute enacted. It seems fair to assume that the medical profession (and perhaps liability carriers) would initiate or increase
appropriate lobying activities to prevent enactment. Whatever the relative
strengths of the opposing forces, and whatever the effect of the "ultimate
wisdom," the one certainty is that, if anything were done legislatively, it
would be a long time coming. To the lawyer in practice, confronted with
clients in need of assistance now, the ultimate wisdom which suggests the
inherent soundness of his position merely aggravates a raw spot long deprived of the protective blister of patience. To him and to the legal profession, the critical question is, what can be done now. This is merely a restate-

5 ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

210 (1960).
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ment of the earlier question of the necessity for authorizing statutes. What is
the legal magic o such statutes?
Each court of general jurisdiction is empowered by statute to subpoena
witnesses. What, then, is the efficacy of a statute specifically authorizing a
court to appoint an expert witness? A couple of purposes suggest themselves.
In some states, there may be no provision for extra compensation for an
expert witness; in order to provide that appropriate compensation which
fairness (and perhaps the Constitution) dictate, the statute authorizing the
appointment may be the vehicle used to authorize payment of expert witness fees. As to such compensation, no problem usually exists in a potential
malpractice action. Plaintiff is willing to pay appropriate compensation;
there is simply no expert willing to testify. The appointment function of the
court is all that is required. Once the court designates an expert to serve the
plaintiff, i.e., to familiarize himself with the case, examine the plaintiff if
necessary, prepare to testify, and, absent settlement, testify, it seems fair to
assume that plaintiff and the expert will be able to reach an appropriate
financial arrangement. If not, the appointing court could take appropriate
action: rescind the appointment, if failure to make the arrangement is the
fault of the plaintiff, or utilize its contempt power if the fault is that of the
expert, presumably as an indirect means to avoid testifying, or itself set a
reasonable amount to be paid the appointed expert. The second purpose of
statutes specifically authorizing the appointment of experts may go to a more
basic issue: an uncertainty as to the existence of inherent court power to appoint and, in effect, to subpoena an unwilling expert witness.
The New York Court of Appeals, 56 upon examining some of the cases, found
two lines of cases in the United States,
1) Those states holding that a court could not compel expert testimony at
all;
2) Those states where a court could compel expert opinions, but even those
states, the New York court observed, limit the opinions to those experts are able
to give without a study of the facts or other preparation. 57
If that is the prevailing law, a court has no inherent power to appoint an
appropriate expert for a plaintiff in a malpractice action. But not all courts
would agree with that statement of the law. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina wrote:
It has been the immemorial custom for the trial judge to examine witnesses
who are tendered by either side whenever he sees fit to do so, and the calling of
" People ex tel. Kraushaar Bros. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947).
Porterfield, The Right to Subpoena Expert Testimony and the Fees Required to be
Paid Therefor, 5 HAsrINGS L.J. 50, 53-54 (1953).
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a witness on his own motion differs from this practice in degree and not in kind.
This practice, in the case of ordinary witnesses, has been approved in some instances. (Citations omitted.) This practice is especially allowable in the matter

of expert witnesses who were originally regarded as amici curiae and were called
by the court. 3 Chamberlayne on Evidence, §§ 2376, 2552.58
In a subsequent one-volume condensation of Chamberlayne's original
five-volume work, the following language appears:
In those cases where an expert is not merely called upon to testify.., but is
asked to perform some special act, aside and apart from that obligation, as for
instance a physician ... to examine facts of the case or attend court during an
entire trial for the purpose of hearing all of the testimony so as to qualify him
to pass an opinion, . .. no good reason can be suggested why he should either be
compelled to do so or be asked to without compensation for the services rendered.

In another class of cases where one who is an expert is called upon to testify,
not merely to facts within his knowledge, but also to express an opinion based
upon facts presented to him, there is some authority in favor of the view that he
should not be compelled to do so without extra compensation.... The weight
of authority, however, favors the view that courts possess the power to summon
experts to testify without any increase over the fees paid to other witnesses.59
Reading these two consecutive paragraphs, the conclusion would seem
to be that: (1) there is no reason for compelling an unwilling expert to prepare for trial; but (2) an expert can be compelled to testify, even as to his
expert opinion concerning facts presented to him. Or, in other words, the
court has inherent power to compel expert testimony from an unprepared
expert. The writer is prepared to "suggest" a "good reason" for compelling
an expert to make pre-trial preparations for testifying in a malpractice action: absent such compulsion plaintiff's case will fail regardless of its merits.
The writer would like to hear some "good reason" why a court can be said
to possess inherent power to compel the opinion testimony of only an unprepared expert. What is the justification for limiting a court's power to hear
only the extempore opinions of an expert, when all (certainly, the expert)
would agree that an opinion based on adequate preparation is much more
likely to be accurate and comprehensive? Perhaps it is a reluctance to compel preparation without compensation. But the concern here is with a case
in which plaintiff is ready, willing, able-and eager-to compensate a physician for his preparation to offer expert testimony.
18State v. Home, 171 N.C. 787, 88 S.E. 433 (1916). The court reversed defendant's murder
conviction because of the undue commendation given to the court's expert by the court in
charging the jury.
5'CHAMBERLAYNE, TRIAL EVIDENCE

§ 226 (Tompkins ed. 1936).
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Imagine the situation which would exist were the courts conceded to have
inherent power to compel only unprepared expert testimony. In a malpractice case, the purported negligence of the defendant almost invariably will
require plaintiff to secure subsequent medical attention. The physician rendering that attention will take a history from the patient, then treat him
professionally. At trial, plaintiff, through the intervention of the court, will
be able to compel the appearance of the treating physician. The doctor will
be compelled to testify as to all those facts which he has discovered during
the course of treatment. In addition, he will be required to offer an expert
opinion as to the! cause of the condition he has been treating. Then, upon
being asked the cTitical question as to the accepted manner of treatment in
that, or a similar locale, of the condition first treated by the defendant, the
expert witness will have these alternatives available to him: (1) profess ignorance of the acceptable professional standard; or (2) express an opinion
as to that standard. If he chooses the first alternative, he will be casting some
doubt on his own professional knowledge and, consequently, diminishing
the credibility the jury will accord him; moreover, he will be "hurting" himself professionally. If he selects the second alternative, he will have to anticipate questions on cross-examination going to the manner in which he determined the appropriate professional standard. Absent any preparation, he
will have to admit that he did not consult any medical texts, professional
journals, or any other literature or appropriate source. He will be compelled
to admit that his "professional standard" is nothing more than an expression of what he would have done had he been in defendant's place. Such a
"standard" might not be adequate to make out a legally sufficient case for
plaintiff. Undoubtedly its expression would have an adverse effect upon the
credibility and professional competence of the expert. One wonders how
many physicians would enjoy selecting either of the alternatives available to
the unprepared expert. Assuming that a court has inherent power to compel unprepared expert testimony, lawyers could confront physicians with
that Hobson's choice. Why don't they?
First, self-interest-and by that is meant the self-interest a lawyer has in
his client's cause. To compel such unsatisfactory expert testimony would be
to accomplish little or nothing for the plaintiff. Moreover, counsel will be
aware of the possibility that a physician put in such an uncomfortable position may retaliate by offering a professional standard wholly in keeping with
defendant's conduct. In that case, the expert can depend on no embarrassing
cross-examination, and counsel for the plaintiff probably would be required
to impeach his own expert and to leave himself with a legally insufficient
case. Second, it seems incontrovertible that trial counsel would prefer working with an expert willing to prepare for trial; at least "willing" in the sense
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that he will prepare if a court so directs. While the physician may be less
than delighted with his appointment, he may realize that appropriate pretrial cooperation with counsel will make his court experience less painful.
Certainly counsel will realize that fact. In short, it seems infinitely more desirable to have a court compel the testimony of a prepared expert than an
unprepared expert, more desirable to the plaintiff, the expert, and the court
and jury.
Why haven't courts been doing this? Much of the explanation may lie in
the traditional backward looking posture of judges and lawyers. It hasn't
been done-or, at least, counsel cannot find case authority for doing it-so it
must be inappropriate. In a profession in which stare decisis plays such a
significant role, this posture isn't surprising. The most innovative and imaginative lawyer feels a psychological lift at finding case authority for a relatively novel approach. Certainly most judges, including those willing to
mold the law to meet current exigencies, feel more comfortable in their roles
as molders of law (and less concerned about reversal) when some authority
can be displayed as an insignia of legitimacy. But significant changes in law,
by definition, lack hoary precedents. This lack should not be treated as a
sinister baton of bastardy. Rather, it should serve as an invitation to judges
and lawyers to examine the problem and attempt to resolve it reasonably.
SUPPOSITIONS

In this article certain suppositions have been made and certain conclusions
drawn. These include:
1) In most medical malpractice actions expert testimony on behalf of the
plaintiff is a requisite to a successful case.
2) The requirement of expert testimony in these actions is the result of a
judicially created standard of care and judicial decisions determining how
that standard must be demonstrated.
3) Generally, a medical malpractice plaintiff will find it impossible to
secure an expert willing to testify regardless of the merits of the case.
4) Interprofessional panels as a potential means of securing expert testimony are unsatisfactory practically and conceptually.
5) Use of learned treatises in lieu of expert testimony is mechanically
high restrictive and practicably unsatisfactory.
6) Statutes authorizing court appointment of medical experts in malpractice cases and providing for compensation for such experts are not unconstitutional.
7) Even absent statutes, courts have an inherent right to appoint expert
witnesses and to provide for their compensation.
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8) This inherent power can be utilized most effectively and most reasonably by requiring experts so appointed to prepare adequately for testifying.
It is submitted., then, that lawyers should begin seeking to have such appointments made and courts should begin granting such requests. Only in
that way will a medical malpractice plaintiff have the opportunity of having
his case heard and decided on its merits.
SUBSEQUENT CONSIDERATIONS
Assuming these suggestions are adopted (admittedly presumptuous on
the part of the author), there will remain two very important practical considerations.
The first of these has to do with the manner in which the appointed expert's
testimony is offered in court, a point already alluded to. 60 Ordinarily, a courtappointed expert is identified as such and his direct testimony elicited by the
court with counsel on either side having the right to cross-examine. It is suggested that such a mode of presentation be avoided. Even absent any unduly
warm commendations offered by the court concerning the testimony of the
court-appointed witness, 61 it seems likely that the jury, upon discovering that
the witness was appointed by the court, may tend to give him undue credibility and his testimony undue weight. After all, the laying on of hands will
have been by the only person in court both learned in the law and disinterested in the outcome. There is likely to be some halo effect enjoyed by the
witness because of identity with the judge, that gowned personification of
justice towering over the entire proceedings. That would be unfair to the
defendant and unrealistic. After all, in the context here considered, the appointed expert is simply an expert appearing for the plaintiff-under judicial compulsion. He should be treated as an expert offered by the plaintiff,
with direct examination by the plaintiff and cross-examination by the defendant. The fact of judicial appointment should not be admissible, certainly not by plaintiff and probably not by defendant. Despite a personal reluctance to "keep things" from the jury, the author feels that the jury will be
given a more accurate depiction of the situation if the fact of appointment
is withheld and the appointee is treated as what he is-a witness for the
plaintiff. The second practical consideration, and one of major importance,
has to do with the practicability of plaintiff's counsel working with and relying upon an unwilling expert witness who has become involved only because
of judicial compulsion. Will such an expert be cooperative, in the appro-
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State v. Home, stupra note 58.
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Supra note 50.
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priate sense of that word, or will he retaliate so as to discourage future court
appointments? Will he lend plaintiff's case the necessary expert testimony,
assuming the facts merit it, or will he destroy plaintiff's case regardless of the
merits? The questions are not easy ones.
In attempting to answer them, it might be well to review some of the reasons which make physicians reluctant to testify on behalf of plaintiffs in malpractice cases. Personal friendship or acquaintance with the defendant probably can be eliminated by appropriate discretion in the selection of the expert. But the other factors remain: recognition of the possibility of error in
a demanding profession, the realization that the expert may some day be in
the defendant's position, the reluctance to place the "kiss of death" on a professional colleague, and fear of retaliation by medical societies and professional liability carriers. The first three factors are inherent, personal feelings
not brought about by external agencies. If they are to be overcome, at least
to the extent of securing a helpful expert, they must be met by factors likely
to evoke contrary feelings on the part of the expert. It would seem that appropriate stimuli to evoke contrary responses to the first two factors would
be a growing familiarity with the plaintiff and his condition and a greater
appreciation of the degree and extent of the professional incompetence of
the defendant. Fortunately, these stimuli will be an integral part of the expert's preparation for trial. As he has contact with the plaintiff and the condition caused by the defendant's conduct, his reaction, as a physician, may
become one of professional (and personal) sympathy for the victim of professional negligence. A growing awareness of the consequences of that negligence should lead to a greater comprehension of the extent of the neglect.
Moreover, as a competent professional, he may well experience a marked
distaste for a botched effort by a professional colleague. As these feelings
grow, the expert's sympathy for and identity with the defendant may diminish. As "error in a demanding profession" is displaced by "downright incompetence," the expert may come to find it more difficult to imagine that he
could have been guilty of such conduct. Indeed, he may come to exhibit the
no longer surprising "phenomenon" that one's most severe critics are indeed
his professional peers. Certainly, the court-appointed expert who, through
adequate pre-trial preparation becomes thoroughly familiar with the plaintiff and his condition and the defendant and his conduct, should be better
equipped to reach this level of sophistication than the physician-members
of an interprofessional screening panel.
Diminution of sympathy for and empathy with the defendant on the part
of the expert should tend to diminish his feelings of assuming a Judas role.
It is one thing to persecute a colleague because of self-doubt; it is quite an-
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other thing to state truthfully that a colleague has failed to meet an appropriate professional standard. In addition, the very existence of a court order
compelling the expert to testify should further diminish his feelings of playing
the part of a Judas. After all, he isn't in court because of a personal desire to be
there; he is there because the court has compelled his presence. Psychologically
this court compulsion should serve to alleviate some of the expert's reluctance
to appear, since he and his professional colleagues will know that he is not
there by choice but by compulsion.
As for potential retaliation by medical societies or professional liability
carriers, it is suggested that the court compulsion responsible for the expert's appearance in court would reduce substantially the likelihood of such
retaliation. Members of the medical societies, aware of the compulsion responsible for the expert's appearance in court (and aware, too, that they
may be subjected to such compulsion), may be extremely hesitant to ostracize the expert witness or in any other way impose professional sanctions upon him. The liability carriers, enjoying the benefit of legal counsel, probably would be extremely reluctant to refuse to renew insurance coverage for
the expert witness following his appearance in court. Such conduct on the
part of the insurance carrier very likely would, and, undoubtedly should,
result in appropriate judicial action aimed at those responsible for obstructing the appropriate functions of the court and of justice. A court willing to
compel an expert witness to testify in a medical malpractice case should be
prepared to take appropriate steps to assure that the witness' compliance
with the court order does not result in professional or economic damage to
the witness.
CONCLUSION

Logic, common sense, and justice suggest that lawyers representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions should seek court appointment of experts, and that the courts should grant such requests. Perhaps, over a period
of time, such judicial action may become commonplace. When it does, physicians, aware of the likelihood of court appointment, may decide to testify
for a plaintiff in a malpractice action even absent judicial compulsion. Just
as lawyers frequently accede to requests from opposing counsel when such
requests are appropriate-and can be converted into judicial mandates-so,
too, may physicians one day recognize the practicality of acceding to requests to serve as experts for plaintiffs in malpractice actions once they are
made aware of the convertibility of the request into a court order. The author is not so naive as to believe that this change in attitude on the part of
physicians will come about immediately. However, if it is to come about at
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all, lawyers must be willing to seek appropriate court orders compelling expert testimony in malpractice actions, and courts must be willing to consider
such requests reasonably. Until the bench and the bar are willing to undertake this task, the "One great obstacle facing the lawyer in malpractice cases
[will continue to be] the problem of obtaining expert testimony."62
62 40
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